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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the advanced circuit features
such as wordline- (WL) underdrive (prevents retention failure) and
overdrive (assists write) employed in the peripherals of Dynamic
RAM (DRAM) memories from a security perspective. In an ideal
environment, these features ensure fast and reliable read and write
operations. However, an adversary can re-purpose them by inserting
Trojans to deliver malicious payloads such as, fault injections, Denial-
of-Service (DoS), and information leakage attacks when activated by
the adversary. Simulation results indicate that wordline voltage can be
increased to cause retention failure and thereby launch a DoS attack in
DRAM memory. Furthermore, two wordlines or bitlines can be shorted
to leak information or inject faults by exploiting the DRAM’s refresh
operation. We demonstrate an information leakage system exploit by
implementing TrappeD on RocketChip SoC.
Index Terms—DRAM, Hardware Trojan, RISCV, RocketChip, In-
formation Leakage, Fault Injection
I. INTRODUCTION
Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication has become increasingly vul-
nerable to malicious modifications in the form of Hardware Trojans
[1] due to the outsourcing of semiconductor design and fabrication
to third party fabrication houses. Ideally, these modifications need to
be detected during pre-Silicon verification and post-Silicon testing.
But, it is possible to design these Trojans to remain dormant
during the test phase and only activate under rare conditions.
Once activated, the Trojans perform undesirable operations such
as write/retention failures or even leak sensitive data. This threat is
of special concern to government agencies, military [2], technology
developers, finance, and energy sectors. Recent news regarding the
tampering of server motherboards by Chinese manufacturers that
affected top US companies like Amazon, Apple etc. [3] provides
as a strong motivation to investigate the possibility of hidden
components in each step of the design and manufacturing process.
Memory Trojan can lead to read/write/retention failures and
information leakage. In prior works, authors have proposed memory
Trojan Trigger circuits and payloads that can evade testing phase
and cause different failures. A Trojan for embedded SRAM is
proposed in [4]. The authors use unique data patterns written to
pre-selected address to trigger their Trojan. Note that these unique
patterns are not tested during standard post-manufacturing memory
tests and thereby remains undetected. That data pattern feeds the
input of the Trojan payload transistors which short the data node
of a victim SRAM cell to ground and corrupts the data. The
feasibility of this Trojan [4] is limited since the payloads require
tapping the bitcells which might not be possible since they are very
compact. [5] introduces an NVM-based Trojan trigger that leverages
the non-volatility of Resistive RAM (RRAM). It possesses unique
characteristics e.g., non-volatility and gradual drift in resistance
with pulsing voltage. The triggers presented exploits RRAM’s
gradual resistance drift under pulsing current and its non-volatility
to ensure that the hammering need not be consecutive. This allows
the trigger to evade system-level detection techniques.
Designing a small, controllable and undetectable Trojan is the key
element to deploy an efficient one. In [6], a capacitor-based analog
Trojan trigger, A2, is presented which is controllable, stealthy and
small. In [7], another capacitor-based Trojan trigger is proposed
which gets activated if a pre-selected address is written with specific
data patterns for a specific number of times. The proposed trigger
circuit is shown in Fig. 1. The circuit has two inputs, EnAdd (the
address enable signal of a pre-selected address) and V p (a logic
circuit generates V p based on the data pattern). The work also
presents payloads of the Trojan such as fault injection, Denial of
Service (DoS) and information leakage attacks on emerging Non-
Volatile Memories (NVMs). The advantage of such trigger lies in
the fact that it can be hidden in the filler areas of the non-memory
logic (e.g., address pre-decoding and pipelining units, also called
midlogic) [8]. However, the payload of this Trojan also requires
tapping the bitcell.
Proposed Attack Model: In this work, we assume an untrusted
manufacturing house located outside the US that can alter the
chip GDS-II file to introduce the malicious Trojan trigger and
payload. This assumption is widely accepted in the hardware
security community because of large filler areas present in the chip
and the adversary’s access to the raw design. We propose the use
of a capacitor-based hardware Trojan trigger [7] and novel payload
circuits and perform detailed analysis to guarantee that the Trojan
is, (i) triggered even under worst-case process and temperature
conditions with correct inputs; (ii) able to bypass conventional
post-manufacturing test. The Trojan is activated if a particular pre-
selected address of L1 Cache is accessed for ∼1800 times. Note that
the proposed Trojan trigger directly taps the wordline of the pre-
selected address to leverage the existing decoder design framework
and hence, does not incur any overhead for address decoding.
In summary, the following contributions are made in this paper.
(a) Investigate DRAM peripherals and their security implications;
(b) Propose a novel Trojans in DRAM that can leak the data by
exploiting the column multiplexing and self-refresh properties;
(c) Propose Trojans in DRAM that can tamper with refresh mech-
anism for polarity dependent fault injection;
Fig. 1: Capacitor-based Trojan trigger circuit proposed in [7].
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(d) Demonstrate TrappeD exploits in action using an open-source
RocketChip SoC system.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the basics
of DRAM design and operation; Section III describes the proposed
trojan trigger design and analysis; Section IV describes the DRAM
vulnerabilities and the attack details; Section V describes the
system implementation to validate the proposed Trojan attacks;
Section VI presents discussions on the practicality, assumptions,
and countermeasures to TrappeD; and finally Section VII draws
the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Basics of DRAM
Fig. 2a shows a basic one-transistor, one-capacitor (1T1C)
DRAM cell. The data is stored as charge in the capacitor Cs.
The charge corresponding to V dd (0V) is considered as data ‘1’
(‘0’). The capacitor Cs gradually leaks or charges up over time and
thereby, it requires to be read and written-back (i.e., refresh).
Architecture: Fig. 2b shows the column structure of an open
bitline architecture [9]. It includes DRAM bitcell, BL, reference
bitline (BLref), sense amp, precharge circuit, column select, write
driver and Half_V cc generator.
The column circuit is implemented with the following features:
a) Sense amp is placed on per-local-column basis to enable read/re-
fresh of the selected column during read and refresh half-selected
columns during write; b) Sense amp is activated by enabling both
the header and footer transistors to prevent static current due to
Half_V cc bitline precharge; c) The precharge and equalization
circuit (equalizes BL and BLref voltages) consists of full CMOS
pass transistors; and d) WL is boosted (to 1.6V in this paper) to
write a full ‘1’ through the NMOS access transistor and under-
driven (to -0.2V in this paper) to reduce sub-threshold leakage
during retention. Positive and negative charge pumps are used for
WL overdrive and underdrive respectively; and e) Column selection
uses PMOS switch.
DRAM operation: The DRAM operation can be classified into
the following categories [10]:
Write: During write, the access transistor M 1 (Fig. 2a) is turned
ON by asserting the WL. The BL is driven to V dd (0V) for writing
data 1 (0). The storage capacitor Cs charges up (discharges) to V dd
(0V) based on BL voltage. Writing data ‘0’ is accomplished by
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) 1T1C DRAM cell including leakage current sources for
data ‘0’ (up) and data ‘1’ (down); (b) one DRAM column with
peripherals.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: DRAM data copy using a) WL shorting; b) BL shorting.
first writing a good ‘1’ on the BLref while the BL stays close to
(threshold voltage of PMOS transistor) and then firing the sense
amp. Once the sense amp is ON, it pulls the BL all the way to 0V
and a good ‘0’ is written to the bitcell.
Read: This begins with pre-charging the BL and BLref to V dd/2
and then the WL is turned ON. The charge stored in Cs charges
(discharges) the BL if the stored data is ‘1’ (‘0’). Therefore, Cs
also develops a differential and loses its stored value (destructive
read). The resulting voltage differential in the BL is converted to
a digital value by the sense amp that compares the BL to the
reference voltage BLref.
Write-back: Following the BL differential development, the
sense amp is enabled. The BL resolves to V dd (0V) and BLref
resolves to 0V (V dd) if the read value is ‘1’ (‘0’). The bitcell
is restored to original value since the WL is still ON after BL
resolves to the read value.
Stand-by (Retention): A data ‘1’ would lose its value once
the charge reduces below V dd/2. Note that this very optimistic
assumption. In reality, the sense amp requires ∼70mV of Sense
Margin (SM) which puts maximum leakage of data ‘1’ to ∼0.640V.
Three major sources of leakage are sub-threshold (I sub), junction
(I j), and gate leakage (Ig) through the access transistor (Fig. 2a).
Data ‘0’ can lose its value if it charges above∼0.360V (to guarantee
70mV of SM). The only source of leakage for data ‘0’ is I sub. In
our model, the charge stored in Cs only rises up to 30mV after
which the rate of charging due to I sub equals the rate of capacitor
discharge. Therefore, data ‘0’ does not suffer from retention issues.
III. TROJAN TRIGGER DESIGN
Design [7]: The trigger circuit (Fig. 1) [7] is designed to be
activated if a particular memory address (chosen during design
phase, let’s call it AddSET ) is accessed for at least NSET times.
The trigger has two inputs namely, V (AddSET) and V (P SET).
V (AddSET) (= 1V in this work) is the wordline enable signal of
AddSET and V (P SET) is a constant voltage source of 1V. For a
more complex Trojan with a superior stealthiness, V (P SET) can be
programmable (refer to Section IV-B for details).
Whenever AddSET is accessed, V (AddSET) is asserted and
MOSFETs M1 and M3 are activated. M2 has a thinner gate oxide
compared to other MOSFETs and its source and drain are shorted.
Therefore, M2 works as a capacitor and charges CTrojan from
the P SET source through Fowler Nordheim (FN) tunneling [11] if
V (AddSET) is asserted. M4 is an OFF transistor which offsets gate
leakage of M5 and prevents unwanted charging-up of node X2.
M7 keeps node X3 as low as possible until node X2 charges up
sufficiently. The node X4, that is charged up during the hammering
process, is used as the SET input of a SR latch. The output of the
SR latch (VTrigger) transitions from 0 → 1 when X4 charges up
to 0.5V. The signal VTrigger is then used to activate the Trojan.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: (a) Design space exploration of Trojan trigger (Fig. 1) with respect to (W/L) ratio of MOSFET M1 and M2; (b) required number
of access (NSET ) increases if the adversary cannot access continuously; (c) a scaled down CTrigger leads to less number of NSET to
activate the trigger. [7]
The charge at node X2 leaks away (due to capacitance leakage of
CTrojan), once the hammering is discontinued. However, VTrigger
will still be asserted due to the SR latch. In order to deactivate the
Trojan, VRESET needs to be asserted. VRESET can be generated
by accessing a different address (let’s say AddRESET ) for at least
NRESET times and using a circuit similar to the trigger one. Note
that a smaller CTrojan (∼1fF) can be used in the RESET circuit to
minimize the area overhead which leads to NRESET = 92. However,
the AND’ed output of V (AddRESET ) and V (PRESET ) can also
serve as VRESET which further reduces the area overhead.
Simulation results: Node X2 charges up to 125mV (steady
state) from all the leakage considering V (P SET) = 1V (worst-case
charging due to leakage). This value is not enough to trigger the
circuit. For the rest of the simulation, we have considered that
V (AddSET) is a pulse source with ON/OFF time of 10ns/1ns. We
consider the circuit to be triggered when V Trigger reaches up to 0.5V.
We started our analysis with CTrojan = 20fF.
Fig. 4a shows the design space exploration of trigger circuit
considering two variables, the (W/L) ratios of MOSFETs M1 and
M2. For a lower (W/L) ratio for both the MOSFETs, NSET
increases. We have chosen (W/L) of M1 and M2 as 4 and 2
respectively for a sufficiently higher NSET .
Next, we considered that the adversary accesses the preselected
address for TON = 10ns and then stays idle for TOFF = 1/3/.../21/23
ns and repeats this cycle. We found that the CTrojan does not
significantly leak in the OFF cycle and the circuit can still be
triggered with a higher NSET (Fig. 4b). We observe that the circuit
will trigger even with a low TON of 30%. This means that it
becomes harder to prevent Trojan activation using system level
techniques such as limiting repeated access to one address.
Note that the attack gets auto reset without the SR latch since the
node X2 discharges (due to charge leak of CTrigger) and eventually
node X4 goes down once the adversary stops the hammering after
the trigger activates. Results indicate that the attack (charge at
node X4) lasts for 163.73µs if AddSET is accessed for 18µs.
However, by adding the SR latch, the attack can last indefinitely
until AddSET access is discontinued and VRESET is asserted.
A small CTrigger will require a low NSET to get the trigger
activated. For example, the required number of access, NSET = 464
for CTrigger = 5fF (Fig. 4c). This is still significantly high enough
to evade the test phase. The value of CTrigger is chosen as 20fF
since it offers a high NSET (= 1837) under nominal conditions,
successfully triggers under all process corners and temperatures (-
10◦C to 90◦C) and minimum NSET in the worst-case (= 68) is
still high to evade testing phase.
Table I summarizes the key performance metrics of the trig-
ger. The absolute area and static power of proposed trigger are
42.95µm2 and 0.589µW, respectively which are 5.34×10-5% and
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: (a) DRAM retention time Vs WL voltage during stand-
by mode at different temperature; (b) retention failure increases
considering process variation at increased WL voltage during
retention.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: (a) Method to increase WL voltage; (b) WL shorting delay
(after the sense amp is fired) Vs sense margin for both data types
stored in Cell 1.
6.24×10-5% of a typical memory chip area and static power [12],
respectively. Therefore, the overhead due to the trigger is negligible
to be detected via optical inspection or side channel analysis.
TABLE I: Features of the Trojan Trigger
Parameter Trojan Trigger
Dynamic Power (µW) 3.781
Static Power (µW) 0.589
Energy/hammer (nJ) 2.059
Area (µm2) 42.97
Target NSET 1837
Worst-Case NSET 1502
IV. DRAM VULNERABILITIES AND TROJANS
In this section, We present methods to exploit the vulnerabilities
of the DRAM assist techniques and refresh mechanisms.
A. DRAM assist and vulnerabilities
Wordline Underdrive and DoS: Fig. 5a shows that the retention
time of data ‘1’ changes as the WL voltage during retention
is swept. The worst case retention occurs at higher temperature.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 7: Data leakage in DRAM through a) WL shorting to copy data ‘0’; b) WL shorting to copy data ‘1’; (c) BL short to copy data
‘0’; (d) BL shorting to copy data ‘1’.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8: Fault Injection through (a) WL shorting; (b) BL shorting.
We consider retention failure if the capacitor discharges below
V dd/2. Note that retention time decreases below -0.2V (due to
Gate Induced Drain Leakage (GIDL)) and above 0.3V (due to
subthreshold leakage) for each of the operating temperatures. The
adversary cannot lower the WL voltage below -0.2V since this
is the lowest voltage available in the chip. However, adversary
can increase the WL voltage during retention. The WL can be
connected to V dd through the transistor MT (Fig. 6a). The gate
of MT is controlled by the AND’ed signal of V Tr (from Fig. 1)
and WL (Fig. 6a). WL is used in order to ensure that the WL
underdrive only occurs during retention.
We have performed 1000 point Monte-Carlo simulation with the
same setup as SRAM to investigate the impact of increased WL
voltage during retention. We consider retention time below 5ms as
failure. From Fig. 5b, we note that if the adversary increases WL
voltage to 0.3V and 0.4V respectively from -0.2V during retention,
the corresponding retention failure is 4.8% and 43.6% respectively,
causing polarity fault injection attack.
Information Leakage - WL Shorting and Refresh: Fig. 3a
shows the method to short WL[1] and WL[2]. It is assumed
that victim and adversary have control over Cell 1 and Cell 3,
respectively. The shorting transistor is controlled by the AND’ed
signal of V Tr and SAEN. SAEN is used to ensure that the WLs are
shorted only after the sense amp is fired. This delay gives the sense
amp sufficient differential between BL and BLref and ensures
Cell 3 value does not corrupt Cell 1 (during sensing) that is being
copied. In the AND Trojan, we get a delay of 40ps which provides
a SM of 69mV. For larger SM an inverter chain can be used. Fig.
6b shows that SM for both data type increases with delay. Note
that WL[2] driver should be disabled during the shorting period.
When WL[1] is asserted to 1.6V during a read operation of Cell
2, WL[2] is also pulled to 1.6V after the sense amp firing. Since
DRAM read operation is destructive and needs a write-back at the
end of read operation, BL[1] will resolve according to the stored
value in Cell 1. Therefore, both Cell 1 and Cell 3 will get written to
the previously stored value in Cell 1 since their WLs are asserted.
This will effectively copy the data to Cell 3.
Fig. 7a shows when Cell 3 is initialized to ‘0’ and data in Cell
1 is read as ‘0’. Both Cell 1 (due to write-back) and Cell 3 are
written to ‘0’. Similarly, Fig 7b shows that data in Cell 1 is read
as ‘1’ and both Cell 1 and Cell 3 are written to ‘1’. This data leak
also applies when Cell 3 is initialized to ‘1’. If WL shorting occurs
with no delay after the sense amp activation, both Cell 1 and Cell 3
are written to Cell 3 data irrespective of the original Cell 1 data as
shown in Fig. 8a. This can be done to inject a polarity dependent
fault to Cell 1. Furthermore, the information leakage attack also
works if write operation is performed to Cell 1 since the BL[1]
will be driven to V dd or 0V based on the write data and both
WL[1] and WL[2] are shorted. One important point to note that
all the cells sharing WL[2] will be corrupted in this process.
Information Leakage -BL Shorting and Refresh:BL shorting
is carried out in a similar way to WL shorting (Fig. 3b). It is
assumed that victim and adversary have control over Cell 1 and
Cell 2, respectively. The explanation for WL shorting holds true
for BL shorting except none of the cells will be corrupted (since
all the cells sharing WL[1] will be refreshed). Fig. 7c shows that
the data in Cell 1 is read as ‘0’ and both Cell 1 (due to write-back)
and Cell 2 (due to BL[2] shorting) are written to ‘0’. Fig. 7d shows
the copy of data ‘1’. Similar to WL shorting, BL shorting can also
be leveraged to inject a polarity dependent fault in Cell 1 as shown
in Fig. 8b. We restrict our discussion on this for the sake of brevity.
B. Trojan design space exploration
We choose the capacitor-based trigger proposed in [7] to generate
the trigger signal (VTr) required to induce the retention failures
(Fig. 6a) and information leakage (Fig. 3) attacks. This is because
the design allows easy change of trigger parameters to vary the
number of address accesses (denoted by EnAdd) required to assert
VTr . We modify the design parameters shown in Fig. 1 to allow the
trigger design to stay undetected at all fast and slow corner cases
and work under multiple temperatures (-10◦C,25◦C, and 90◦C). The
modified design is shown in Fig. 1. Additionally, we include an SR
latch to capture the trigger output.Note that the attack gets auto reset
without the SR latch since the node X2 discharges (due to charge
leak of CTrojan) and eventually node X4 discharges once the
adversary stops the hammering after the trigger activates. Results
indicate that the attack (charge at node X4) lasts for 163.73µs if
AddSET is written for 18µs with V (AddSET) = 1V, V (P SET) = 1V.
However, by adding the SR latch, the attack can last indefinitely
until AddSET access is discontinued and VRESET is asserted.
V. SYSTEM EXPLOITS USING TRAPPED
A. Overview of systems architecture
For the purposes of demonstration, we show a simple information
leakage attack using TrappeD. We use a RISC-V based RocketChip
[13] SoC template for implementing the TrappeD system. Our
Fig. 9: RocketChip emulator waveform showing Trigger_en
signal enabled after 1837 adversary accesses and disabled after
1999 accesses.
RocketChip SoC is configured with an in-order Rocket Core, a fast
L1 data cache, and connects to an external DRAM on the AXI port
(mapped to 0x80000000), which serves as the main memory for
the system.
B. TrappeD trojan deployment
We modified the RocketChip code to inject the Trapped trigger
and payload. The trigger logic is introduced in the D-cache and the
payload logic in the DRAM. For modelling the effects of trigger, we
instantiate a 32-bit register (AccessCounter) that is initialized
to ‘0’. Accesses to the trigger address (= 0x80022328)
increments the register value by ‘1’. We introduce logic to detect
if these increments have reached our NSET threshold of 1837,
to active the trigger signal (trigger_en). The trigger signal is
sent to the payload logic. Once triggered, the signal stays asserted
to facilitate the attack till the adversary accesses the trigger
address an additional 163 times. The waveform generated from the
RocketChip hardware emulation depicting trigger_en enabled
and disabled is shown in Fig. 9. The payload activates when
trigger_en is high. To model the effects of the payload,
we select two addresses: (i) an adversary controlled address,
adversary (= 0x800222E8), and (ii) a victim address, victim
(= 0x800222A8). The payload logic shorts the two addresses,
effectively copying the data from victim to adversary, facili-
tating an information leakage attack.
C. Attack demonstration
We demonstrate the attack with the help of a simple C program
as shown in Listing 1. The code is compiled with the riscv-gcc
compiler to generate a RISC-V ELF binary that can be run
on the cycle-accurate emulator for the RocketChip system. For
simplicity, we have assumed that the adversary and victim
addresses are part of the same process, and the adversary can access
adversary, but not victim. We also assume that the adversary
has control over the number of times the trigger address can
be accessed. The program initializes contents of adversary to
‘0’ and victim to the confidential information ‘8575309’. The
program loops over and accesses trigger 1837 times, which is
greater than the minimum accesses required by the Trojan trigger as
set by NSET , thus activating the trigger_en signal. The payload
causes an information leakage by copying the confidential contents
of victim to adversary. The adversary can now read out from
adversary address and thus reveal the confidential information
‘8675309’, as shown in Fig. 10.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Fault injection and DoS Attack
If read/write/retention failure occurs for one polarity (either for
data ‘0’ or ‘1’), it is considered as fault injection. Such attack
can leak system assets [14] such as, keys. One example is setting
plaintext to all 0 or 1 by injecting faults during crypto operation
Fig. 10: RocketChip emulator console output for the attack code in
Listing 1. It can be seen that adversary reads ‘8675309’ after
Trojan activation.
which makes the ciphertext (that is sent out) same as keys, and can
be recovered by the adversary. However, if failure occurs for both
polarities, it is considered as DoS attack.
B. Bypassing error detection
In state-of-the-art memory, techniques like Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) or Error Correcting Code (ECC) [15] is implemented.
The ECC and/or CRC word is computed for the raw data and written
along with data during write operation. During read operation,
CRC/ECC is again calculated based-on the read data and matched
with the stored CRC/ECC. If read or even write operation incurs
an error, CRCs/ECCs will not match and the data can be discarded.
Furthermore, ECC can correct 1/2 bits of error (based on the
implementation). Therefore, fault injection will fail and adversary
can only launch DoS attack. However, if the CRC or ECC bits are
also tampered to match the data with injected fault, the manipulated
data will be considered as valid data.
C. Possible defenses
i) Dummy Bits: Each row of the memory can be designed with
few dummy bits. During run-time, each row can be written with
known dummy bits and read to validate. During Trojan induced
fault/DoS, the dummy bits will fail which can be detected as an
attack. However, information leakage cannot be detected. Note that
this will incur slight area and power overhead.
ii) Trusted ECC: The current implementation of ECC adds a few
global columns in the memory. For example, if the data width is
64 bit and ECC needs 5 bits, a total of 69 global columns are
implemented in the memory array. This is a vulnerability since the
ECC bits can also be tampered. We propose to separate the ECC
bits from the data bits and store them in a trusted memory known
to be Trojan free through rigorous validation (possible due to small
size). This way the fault injection, DoS and information leakage
attacks can be detected since ECC bits can be checked to detect
the tampering at run-time (once Trojan is activated).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the advanced circuit features
employed in the peripherals of nanometer memories e.g., WLUD
and wordline overdrive for DRAM from a security perspective. We
show that an adversary can manipulate these features to launch fault
injection attacks and DoS. The adversary can also leverage wordline
shorting and bitline shorting in order to leak sensitive information.
We also demonstrated the feasibility of launching system exploits
leveraging TrappeD on RocketChip SoC platform.
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